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ABSTRACT 
 
In the Philippines, the post-Marcos era has seen little decrease in violence against 
journalists.  The onset of democratization in 1986 gave way for more press freedom, yet 
the 78 journalists killed since question the notion of a functioning free press in a nation 
that prides itself as being the “freest” in the Southeast Asian region.  The study posits that 
the condition of the Philippines as a weak state enables the deaths of journalists to occur 
and continue. The effect of their killings is that the diversity of the press is threatened, 
and by extension the provincial public sphere is limited from accessing information that 
is of concern to their immediate environment.  Journalists, domestic media organizations 
and international organizations are taking concrete actions towards mitigating the adverse 
effects and creating a safer working environment.  
 
Keywords:  Philippines, journalist killings, press freedom, public sphere, weak state, 
impunity 
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The Deadliest Free Press in Asia: A Case Study of the Philippines 
 
“I used to brag that I eat threats for breakfasts, lunch and dinner.” - Nonoy Espina.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Research Problem 
 
Much attention has been given to the dangerous work of journalists in conflict zones 
where they are vulnerable to kidnappings, death by crossfire or by murder.  Since the 
onset of the U.S. led war on terror, no one has been spared by print, radio and television 
news accounts of the many local and international journalists being physically harmed 
and gruesomely killed, with Iraq contributing the most to the general increase in media 
deaths worldwide (Taback & Coupland 2006). Though arguably true, descriptive 
accounts of antipress violence, in particular murders have not been completely absent.  In 
the early 1990’s, African journalists worked under turbulent environments, where nations 
such as Angola and Rwanda, nations plagued by civil war, reflected the situation of many 
other nations in the continent at that time (Matloff 1995).  However, there is little 
attention in academic and mainstream media discussion on the targeted homicide of 
journalists in democratic nations. Murders of journalists affect many new and or 
transitional democracies-- “peace time” nations such as the Philippines, Mexico, India, 
Brazil and Russia1 (CPJ 2009).  One case in particular has garnered international 
attention, that of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, famed for her investigative 
reports on Chechnya (Chivers 2006).  She was killed in 2006, gunned down in her own 
apartment building (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
1 Whether a nation is a peace-time democracy or not is considered in relation to several 
factors. First, it acknowledges that not all countries that are peacetime democracies are 
without conflict. However, it considers whether or not (a) the conflict is nationwide;  (b) 
if the conflict impedes the function of the constitution; (c) if journalists are caught in 
crossfire, and whether it is connected to a national conflict or in the local, political 
situation.  
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In the Philippines, the post-Marcos era has seen little decrease in violence against 
journalists.  Though the onset of democratization in 1986 gave way for more press 
freedom, the 78 journalists killed since question the notion of a functioning free press in a 
nation that prides itself as being the “freest” in the region.  The years 2004, 2005 and 
2006 have been the deadliest period, with a total of 21 journalists murdered.  As the press 
plays an integral role in democratization and development, why this form of violence 
continues to occur is a question that must be addressed. 
 
Theoretical discussions of why such killings occur in democratic contexts and its 
social significance for the general public is limited. Several studies and academic 
literature, straddling various fields of studies has shed some light on the issue.  Silvio 
Waisbord (2000, 2002 & 2007) has studied the Latin American experience and the crisis 
of the state and statelessness. He proposes that violence against the press (verbal and 
physical threats, as well as murder), are a result of the state’s inability to monopolize the 
legitimate means of violence and the lack of accountability for the attacks’ perpetrators 
(2002: 91-92).  Such violence instills fear and self-censorship (Chalaby 2002:22) and by 
extension public discourse controlled and suppressed (Wasibord 2002: 94). Nathan 
Taback and Robin Coupland view attacks against journalists within a human security 
framework (2006).  They conclude that such attacks, if policy and decision makers 
choose to listen, can serve as an early indicator of trends that are detrimental to human 
security in a given context.  An international epidemiological study by L. Riddick, G. 
Thomson, N. Wilson and G. Purdie (2008) analyzes international indices relating to 
human development and the social and political functioning of states.  Their study 
concludes that the homicide of media workers is a public health issue because of the “role 
of media quality as a determinant of societal wellbeing” (ibid.: 682).   
 
In terms of comparison, Latin America serves as a case in point for understanding 
the manifestations of such murders in the Philippines.  In particular nations such as 
Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Mexico provide illustrating examples of nations that were 
under authoritarian regimes and became part of the second wave of democratization and 
are new democracies.  For example, between the 1989-1997, approximately 900 physical 
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and verbal attacks against journalists were recorded in Argentina (Waisbord 2000).  
Similarly, these nations faced a high degree of violence against journalists following the 
authoritarian period.  However, Latin America has made significant progress in 
addressing the issue of violence against journalists through the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in which cases 
were decided on the basis of integrating societal and individual rights in international law 
(Perkins 2002). The cases involving the deaths of journalists affirmed that their deaths 
were a violation of the individuals right to life, and the societal right to information 
(ibid).  In cases dealing with questions of free press, such as prior restraint, contempt, 
violence against journalists and official insult, the court and commission have used the 
societal right to freedom of the press as a ratio decedendi for their final decisions (ibid.).  
Though each nation has its own context-specific circumstances that attribute to violence 
against journalists, Latin America can serve as an example of how new democracies can 
institutionally address the issue.   
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to contribute and expand our understanding of the role of 
a free press in informing the public sphere within the context of a new democracy.  
Academic literature on press and democracy have largely been written in and focused on 
the experience of the West, therefore reflecting “the absence of antipress violence in 
Western nations,” thus neglecting an issue facing historically weak democracies 
(Waisbord 2002: 90).  Though the study is nation specific, there is an aspect of 
transferability, as there are other countries in the developing world that face a similar 
situation in a democratic context.   
 
The Philippines presents an anomaly in the Southeast Asian region, as it is the 
only nation in the region with a constitutional guarantee for a free press (Chua 2006).  
While other democratic nations in the region, such as Singapore (Hay Tey 2008), face a 
number of censorship laws that impede free speech and journalistic endeavors in general, 
such censorship laws do not exist in the Philippines. However, recently Thailand, has had 
incidences of journalists killings (K Chaipipat 2009, Interview 23 March). Two 
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journalists were murdered in 2008, and preliminary investigations into their deaths reveal 
that they were working for provincial level media covering anomalies and corruption at 
the local level (ibid.)  However, these two murders were the first ones to occur after a 
decade.  The Philippines is an extraordinary case in that the number of journalists killed 
annually remains high in relation to other nations in the region.   
 
The study explores how new democracies are faced with very different challenges 
as it relates to press freedom.  It affirms that direct acts of violence towards media 
personnel are often barriers for the public to receive information.  It also explores how 
various socio-political factors and conditions related to state institutions can impede the 
function of a free press in a given society.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Research on the subject matter conducted prior to actual fieldwork in the Philippines 
yielded several preliminary findings. Those are:  
o The prevalence of paramilitary, or personal military groups of politicians and  
local leaders have a distinct role in the phenomenon. 
o The role of the Philippine media as a gatekeeper of information has been  
adversely affected. 
o The decreased surveillance role of the media has affected democratic institutions. 
o Free press and democratization are systematically undermined at the local level. 
These preliminary findings helped formulate the research questions, which evolved as 
more data became available during the fieldwork.  In consideration, the demarcations of 
the study are thus guided by the following research questions: 
o What is the existing pattern of killings, in terms of location, frequency and the 
types of journalists? 
o What aspects of Philippine politics and society affect and or facilitate the threats 
and killings of journalists? 
o Why is this important? 
o Is this indicative of the role of media and the press in new democracies 
and weak states? 
o By extension, what do the deaths mean in terms of the concept of the public 
sphere? 
o How does this challenge the notion of “Free Press” in the Philippines? 
 
 
  10 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
The case study is examined with two theoretical lenses, both of which are interrelated. 
Freedom of the press is referred to within its role in a given society, bounded within a 
state, therefore theories of the state are important when discussing and conceptualizing 
freedom of the press.  The Philippines is a weak state (Abinales and Amoros 2005; Bello 
2002; Van de Loo 2004).  According to Rakipi (2002), there is confusion in the literature 
as to the definition of a weak state, but this could be due to what Robert I. Rotberg (2003) 
describes as the broad continuum of what constitutes a weak state (4).  But regardless, 
what most separates a weak state from that of a strong one is the provision of political 
goods, with the state’s prime function as being the provision of security (ibid.).  As such, 
a weak state, like the Philippines is either unable to, or has difficulty delivering political 
goods that are necessary to a democracy.  Rakipi introduces a liberal democratic 
framework in assessing state weakness, and asserts that state strength is based on the 
degree of political legitimacy (2002). This framework is applicable for the reason that the 
Philippine constitution espouses it as a liberal democracy . 
 
Second, the concept of the public sphere first introduced by Jürgen Habermas, 
who developed it within the context of 18th century Europe (Habermas 1964) is 
considered.  He describes the public sphere as: 
“By the ‘public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all 
citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which 
private individual assemble to form a public body” /…/ On when the exercise of political 
control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand that information be 
accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win an institutionalized influence 
over the government through the instrument of law-making bodies” (ibid.). 
 
Habermas asserts that in contemporary times, newspapers, radio, television and 
magazines are the media of the public sphere.  This is related to the “democratic demand” 
that information is publicly accessible.  As such, the media is an essential part in the 
deliberative process that the public sphere partakes in, before it is able to influence the 
government institution. In “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy 
Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical 
Research”, Habermas (2006) expands on the discussion of the role of political 
  11 
communication, the public sphere, journalists and deliberative democracy.  He asserts 
that the public sphere is at the periphery of the political system, connected by “wild flows 
of messages” of published opinions: news, reports, commentaries, talks, images, etc. 
(ibid.: 415). These messages originate from various types of actors and selected and 
shaped by mass media professionals and received by an audience (ibid.).  He avers that 
the public sphere could not be put to work without: (1) professionals of the media system, 
with an emphasis on journalists who edit reports, commentaries and news; (2) politicians 
who occupy political positions (ibid.:416). Journalists, along with private and public 
actors join in the construction of public opinion (ibid.: 417).  Mass media constitute a 
source of power, based on technology and its capacity to intervene and influence public 
opinion and influential interests.  The role and influence of Philippine journalists and the 
press are interpreted within these conceptions of the public sphere. In addition, the 
research considers that provincial areas constitute a public sphere that is part of the 
deliberative democratic process.  
 
1.5 Methodology and Selection 
1.5.1 Research Design 
As a piece of qualitative research, there are specific ontological, epistemological and 
methodological points of departures in regards to the thesis topic.  Ontologically, this 
paper considers that there are existing independent factors in the phenomenon of 
journalists killings. These factors can be viewed as being the journalists themselves, 
media and civil organizations, the government, the murders, the socio-political structure 
and the public sphere.  Epistemologically, these independent factors create an 
accumulation of knowledge and information that is used to describe the phenomenon and 
how it affects the provincial public sphere in the Philippines (Moses & Knutsen 2007: 
50).  
 
A constructivist perspective is used for the research, as such, the approach to 
inquiry is an intrinsic case study (ibid), as it makes a “thick” description of the 
phenomenon at hand and attempts to understand it within the Philippines, its natural 
context.  As an intrinsic case study, analytic induction is used to generate a hypothesis 
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(Ragin 1991:1 01), as well as reflects some aspects of historical research (Moses & 
Knutsen 2007: 116-141), which is most apparent in the descriptive environment and 
context that the phenomenon occurs. The study is thus analyzed within a bounded system 
(Creswell 2007:74). As such the research is bounded two ways: first in relation to a time 
frame of approximately seven years from 2001 until the end of 2008; second to its 
geographic specificity in the Philippines (ibid.: 73).  
 
1.5.2 Sources of Data 
 
Various sources of data were consulted during the formulation of the research.  These 
included newspaper accounts, academic journal articles and books pertaining to the 
subject, media publications, Supreme Court documents, field notes, and key informant 
interviews  
 
1.5.3 Key Informants: Selection Criteria 
Key informants for the research were interviewed between February 26, 2009-March 23 
2009 during the researcher’s stay in Metro Manila, Philippines, though correspondence 
with the interviewees began in late January.  Eight interviews were conducted in total, 
four of which were conducted in the long interview format, the other four in the short 
interview format. All interviews were semi-structured and audio recorded for 
transcription purposes, with key informant consent.  The rich information provided by the 
key informants serve as a basis for understanding the whole phenomenon in the context 
of the Philippines, representing a broad purposive sample in which participants were 
chosen (Creswell 2007: 125-129). Selection of informants was based on the following 
criteria: 
1. The level of approximation, or level of personal experience to an incidence of 
media threat or killing. 
2. Those persons involved in media organizations monitoring the progress and or 
development of the media situation in the Philippines. 
3. Philippine government officials/spokes persons that are involved in the process of 
investigating and or creating policies in relation to the media and or media 
killings. 
 
According to the formulated criteria and availability, the researcher was able to interview 
various local media organizations, practicing journalists, editors, an international media 
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monitoring agency, a representative of a regional network of media practitioners, and an 
attorney and a representative of the judicial branch of the Philippines.   
 
Some interviewees fulfilled more than one requirement, however, only one 
person, Justice Rodulfo Azcuna, fulfilled the last requirement. Those interviewed 
conducted in the long format were: Malou Mangahas, Executive Director of the 
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ); Nonoy Espina, Vice Chairman of 
the National Union of Journalists (NUJP) and Breaking News Editor for the Inquirer.net;2 
Rodulfo Azcuna, Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court;3 and Dr. Luis V. Teodoro, 
Deputy Director of the Center for Media Freedom and Reponsibility (CMFR).  This 
initial contact with Dr. Teodoro and Mr. Espina allowed for the possibility for the 
researcher to attend the launch of CPJ’s 2009 Global Impunity Index in Manila, where 
the short interviews were conducted impromptu.  The short interviews were conducted 
with Elizabeth Witchel, Coordinator for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ); 
Attorney Nena Santos; Rowena Paraan, NUJP Treasurer and Executive Coordinator of 
the Media Safety Office; and Kulachada Chaipipat, Campaign and Advocacy Officer for 
the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA).  
 
1.5.4 Reliability of Key Informants 
The key informants were chosen for their experience in their respective fields and their 
prominence, involvement and knowledge in the subject of the study.  Mangahas is a 
former print editor and takes the position formerly held by famed journalist Sheila 
Coronel in PCIJ.  In addition, the PCIJ has been referred to as Asia’s premier 
organization for investigative journalism. The organization has also been an influential 
force in the Philippines in setting journalistic standard and political influence; as its 
investigative reports led to what became People Power II.  Espina formerly worked as a 
provincial journalist prior to becoming the breaking news editor for the online version of 
one of the nation’s leading newspaper’s, thus providing a provincial and metropolitan 
perspective.  In addition, as head of the NUJP, he is the “face” of Filipino journalism, 
                                                 
2 Inquirer.net is the online version of the national newspaper the Daily Inquirer. 
3 Now retired. 
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often representing the journalistic community at government functions and press 
conferences related to the issue.4  As a union, NUJP explicitly stands for and advocates 
for the rights of journalists.  Justice Azcuna represents the highest echelons of the 
Philippine judicial system and worked on the formulation of the 1987 Constitution under 
Corazon Aquino.  He was the first justice that suggested the incorporation of the Writ of 
Amparo in the Philippine Constiution.5  In addition, he has been central to the Philippine 
judicial reform process, forming and leading assessment teams in the creation and launch 
of judicial projects.  Dr. Teodoro is a leading academic in the field of communication in 
the Philippines, formerly holding the position of Dean of the School of Communication at 
the University of the Philippines. He has written numerous books, and is currently a 
writer and contributor of many CMFR books and documents, as well as serving as an 
editor for the organization’s newspaper.  In addition CMFR has a defined methodological 
system in which the organization uses in documenting journalist killings. 
 
 The four long interviews lasted between 40-55 minutes each; all of which took 
place according to the desired time and location proposed by the interviewee. Mangahas 
interview took place at the PCIJ main office, Teodoro at the CMFR office, Justice 
Azcuna at the Philippine Supreme Court building, and Espina at a Starbucks venue. 
Interviews with Mangahas, Azcuna and Teodoro were conducted in the daytime, during 
the respective working hours of each individual.  The interview with Espina was 
conducted in the evening.  Though the interview questions were tailored according to the 
interviewee, several questions were repeated in different ways to certain interviewees. 
This most applied to Mangahas, Teodoro and Espina, as questions with Justice Azcuna 
was centered around rule making function of the Supreme Court and the new remedies 
implemented to address the issue of media killings. The subjects of the questions were: 
whether or not Philippine journalism has been adversely affected by the killings of 
journalists; what their respective organization/group has done to address the issue; 
whether or not there are differences between Metro Manila6 and provincial areas that lead 
to the why journalists are more frequently targeted; if there is a noticeable difference in 
                                                 
4 Often such events are nationally televised.  
5 Discussed under Impunity and a Weak Judicial System  
6 Also referred to as National Capital Region (NRC). 
  15 
the advent of journalist killings from 2001 onwards; and whether international attention 
has alleviated the phenomenon. Only the question regarding international attention was 
similar in all four interviews.  However, it should be noted that in the interviews, 
recurring themes occurred without the researcher explicitly prompting or asking a 
question. 
  
The short interviews, those of Witchel, Santos, Paraan and Chaipipat were 
conducted after the official event of CPJ’s 2009 Global Impunity Index in Manila. 7  As 
such, the interviews were less than 10 minutes each.  The interviewees were also 
preoccupied with speaking with other guests of the event, as it drew many others working 
for the media industry domestically in the Philippines and internationally, thus the 
opportunity for conducting a long interview was not possible.  The four were chosen for 
the different perspectives and roles that they present in the issue of media killings.  
Witchel for her perspective as a individual working for an international agency 
monitoring the advent of media killings globally; Santos for her legal perspective as a 
lawyer representing the case of a slain journalist; Paraan for her practical role as a trainer 
and workshop leader in journalist safety; and Chaipipat for a Southeast Asian regional 
perspective.  The questions asked the individuals, though limited in time, were in relation 
to their work.  Thus, though all work in the same issue, they encompass various areas.  
 
The Manila Launch of CPJ’s 2009 Impunity Index was an informative event 
itself.  The researcher was able to take part in participatory observations during the event; 
taking notes as speakers presented, including asking a question during the Q&A.  The 
researcher was also able to speak informally with various members of the media about 
their work, and their personal experiences as it related to the Conference topic. The 
Impunity Index compiles global data on the number of journalists killed in each nation, 
then calculates the data in relation to the number of prosecutions in relation to a nation’s 
population.  As such, it was an opportunity to observe how a situation like the Philippines 
is repeated in other parts o the world.  During the conference, CPJ representatives 
expressed that they chose the Philippines as the official site of the launch for the reason 
                                                 
7 Those sections of the events listed on the Conference agenda.  
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that they thought that the nation “is a poster child for impunity,” and that it is the highest 
ranking peace time nation on this year’s list (CPJ’s 2009 Global Impunity Index, 
presentation).  CPJ is one of several international organizations that work and collaborate 
with Philippine based press and media organizations in the issue of journalist killings.   
 
1.5.5. Analysis and Transcription 
All interviews were reviewed and transcribed, and accuracy of the resulting transcribed 
documents were cross-referenced with the audio recordings and notes taken at the time 
that the interview took place. They were then rhetorically analyzed focusing on an aspect 
that directly affected the progression of the work: recurring themes.  Several recurring 
themes emerged from the interviews: 
 
1. The murders of journalists are a free press issue, in that they are killed in relation 
to the nature of their work. 
2. The socio-political structure of the Philippines makes provincial areas and 
provincial journalists more vulnerable. 
3. A culture of impunity due to a weak judicial system is an impediment in 
addressing the issue through proper jurisdiction. 
4. Various media organizations are taking concrete steps to address the issue. 
 
Theme one is used in relation to the research framework as a whole. Themes two 
and three are used in the conceptualization of the Philippines as a weak state. Theme four 
informs the discussion on the public sphere.  All themes were cross-referenced for 
relevance with other literature and data.   
 
1.5.6  Criticism of the Sources and Limitations  
The fieldwork was limited to the Metro Manila area.  Though the researcher intended to 
visit provincial areas and interview local journalists, this was not possible due to the fact 
that safety and shelter could not be guaranteed.  However, Nonoy Espina, as a former 
provincial journalist, was able to provide a provincial perspective on the phenomenon.   
 
In regards to ethical considerations, the long interviews were preceded by a 
formal letter of request (Appendix I) in which the researcher introduced herself as a 
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graduate student from Lund University studying at the Center for East and Southeast 
Asian Studies.  The researcher fully disclosed her intentions and the subject matter as 
well specific as aspects of the subject that the researcher hoped to learn from the 
informant.  However, procedures leading to the interview with Justice Azcuna differed in 
that interview questions were submitted to the Supreme Court in advance prior to getting 
approval for a personal interview.  All long interviews were conducted with an interview 
protocol (Appendix II), which was tailored according to each key informant. The short 
interviews did not follow the same procedure as the four long interviews in the use of a 
formal letter of request and an interview protocol.  This is due to the reason that the 
opportunity to speak and interview those participants occurred spontaneously during the 
said media function. A tape recorder was only used upon the verbal consent of the key 
informant. 
 
2.  MEDIA VIOLENCE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN A WEAK STATE: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As literature specifically related to the topic at hand was not readily available, academic 
literature was used from various fields of studies to provide the researcher with a holistic 
perspective as it relates to the phenomenon. This included works from political science, 
international relations and media/communication studies. The literature focused around 
several themes: the concept of freedom of the press; the state and democratization; and 
the public sphere.  Only articles and books that most influenced the thoughts of the 
researcher and the direction of the research are discussed in the Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Political Dimension of the Media: Theories and Political Systems 
Siebert et. al identifies four main theories of the press, or four concepts of mass 
communication, that is determined by the type of society or social system of a nation 
(Maslog 1992: 17). These are Authoritarian, Libertarian, Soviet Communist and Social 
Responsibility (Sibert et al. 1956 cited in Maslog 1992: 17; Flor 1992: 45).  A fifth theory 
has been proposed as alternatives to those models (Mc Quail 2000: 178), that of 
Development Communication or DevCom, around the chief purpose of social 
transformation and development (ibid.: 49).  These have been noted as not being actual 
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theories, but rather typologies of the press, which thus serve as a basis for theory 
construction (Flor 1992: 45).  Representing the notion of a free press, the Philippines falls 
under the Libertarian System, as such it “espouses freedom of the press from government 
control. All ideas are to be given a fair hearing. Society becomes a ‘free market place of 
ideas’” (Masalog 1992:17-46).  
 
The concept of freedom of the press is often dealt with in relation to the concept 
of freedom of speech; both are notions that come from the liberal and utilitarian political 
philosophy, notably of figures such as John Stuart Mill (Mc Quail 2000: 169).  The press 
is therefore reiterated and reaffirmed as an essential corollary to democracy and self-
governance (Stone 1987; Jeffrey 1986; Graber 1986). As a constitutional guarantee the 
prime function of a free press in Libertarian societies is to serve as a fourth institution 
outside that of the three branches of government (Stone 1987).  It has thus metaphorically 
referred to as the “Fourth Estate,” a term coined in 18th century England (Mc Quail 
2000:169).  Freedom of the press represents a normative aspect of media and society, in 
that there are underlying benefits from the media that extend out to the individual and the 
society as a whole (ibid.: 162).  Within literature, there is general consensus in regards to 
the most important functions of the press, which can be identified as (1) to keep citizenry 
informed, which is a necessity for a democratic system; (2) maintain independence from 
government; (3) provides a forum for the discussion of diverse opinions and ideas; (4) 
serve as a public agent in communicating with officials; (5) report abuses of power and 
misconduct of officials (Stone 1987; Jeffrey 1986; Graber 1986).  All are overlapping 
functions that work in conjunction with one another.  Journalism and journalists are the 
purveyors that work within the free press.  Martin Eide (2007), argues that in modern 
societies, “the power of journalism is decisive in the exercise of power and democracy,” 
which is of prime-importance to its agenda-setting capacity.  This is implied in the role 
and effect of journalism on issues that never reach the public agenda, and its decisive role 
in ideology.  This power and agency is not possible without the provisions of a free press 
within a given democratic social system.   
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2.2  The Role of the Media in Democratization 
The role of the media in a nation like the Philippines differs from developed nations with 
consolidated democracies.  The press can be understood as part of mass communication, 
or media as a whole, which incorporate and cover many mediums and forms of public 
communication. The media can play a key role in the political transitions of states, 
largely from authoritarianism to democracy (O’Neil & Reinner 1998). Literature in 
political science, economics, sociology and economics have addressed the role of media 
in democratic development, but there is no real consensus on the role that media can play 
in the democratic process (McConnell & Becker 2002).  In contrast to considering what 
role media can have, Sallie Hughes (2007) takes a more practical approach, considering 
actual press performance in new democracies, using Latin American as an example.  She 
takes an organizational imperative standpoint, discussing environmental barriers such as 
the weakness of the rule of law, and internal organizational barriers such as the media 
owner’s instrumental use of the news (ibid.).  There are also those that hold the view that 
“media reform is needed for media freedom, and media freedom is a necessary condition 
for democratization” (Tudo, Vlad & Nusser 2004: 1).  
 
2.3 The Media and the Public Sphere: Habermas and Beyond 
 
Habermas’ conceptualization of the public sphere has influenced media studies and 
continuous to be reinterpreted and used in many contexts.  Steven E. Clayman (2004) 
looks into news and public affairs programming that involve audience participation, and 
analyzes them as distinct arenas of the public sphere.  Brian McNair (2000) has a 
descriptive and thorough account of journalism and the political public sphere in Great 
Britain at the turn of the century, focusing on the crisis of the political media.  In a 2005 
article, John Parkinson discusses deliberative democracy and the affect of media on 
public opinion, and the structural concern in relation to the media’s role in democracy.   
 
2.4 An Explanatory Framework for Killings of Journalists: Insights from the Latin 
American Experience 
Latin American literature on media and democracy has been the most 
comprehensive in “piecing together” the various aspects that help understand the research 
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topic. Three authors in particular are David J. Park (2002), Michael Perkins (2002), and 
Silvio Waisbord (2000, 2002, 2007).  David J. Park (2002) argues that the quality of 
Argentina’s transitional democracy is limited by media concentration, institutional 
connection with the media, foreign ownership and violence against the press that these 
restrict discussion on human rights issues. This essentially limits the reconciliation of a 
public sphere severely damaged by the “Dirty War.”  Michael Perkins (2002) details the 
development of the “societal right to freedom” of the press in the international human 
rights law of Latin America via the Inter America Commission and the Inter American 
Court of Human Rights.  He uses decisions and cases related to free-press questions such 
as prior restraint, contempt laws, official insult and violence against journalists. However, 
the Writings of Silvio Waisbord in La Politica Del Palo (2000), Antipress Violence and 
the Crisis of the State (2002), and Democratic Journalism and “Statelessness” (2007) 
have been the most relevant to the topic of this research, and synthesizing various 
concepts in the said literature.  In relating to anti-press violence in Latin America, 
Waisbord considers the concept of the crisis of the state in the IR perspective and the 
concept of “statelessness.”  Essentially, the state accounts for the reason as to why the 
press, in particular investigative reporters and publications, are targets of violence.  He 
uses Max Weber’s concept of the state (1978), and heavily refers to works of John Keane 
Media and Democracy (1991) and Reflections on Violence (1996).  
 
3. DISPOSITION 
The thesis body is divided in four main sections. First it begins with a historical overview 
of the Philippine press, including contemporary developments and a description and 
profiles of those journalists killed.  The second section discusses the condition of the 
Philippines as a weak state, and is divided in three parts: local/provincial politics, the 
monopolization of violence and culture of impunity affected by a weak judicial system.  
The third section examines the effects of the deaths on the public sphere and the actions 
taken by journalists and media organizations.  The last section of the thesis is the 
conclusion 
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4. A PROFILE OF THE PHILIPPINE PRESS AND JOURNALISTS KILLED 
 
4.1 Development of the Philippine Press and Contemporary Issues 
Though oral and written literature flourished in pre-Hispanic Philippines, the modern 
press has its roots during the Spanish colonial period (Anables 2003: 4).  However, unlike 
other European or Asian nations, the Philippines does not have a tradition of state or 
party-owned presses or broadcasts, and has been privately owned from the beginning 
(Coronel 2001: 4).  Today the broadcast medium is highly commercialized.  During the 
19th century, more than 100 newspapers were published, most in Spanish (ibid.)  The 
Philippine press became the site of which the notion of a free nation was born, with 
propagandist material aimed at reform and influencing Spanish policy on the archipelago 
began. This included not only press in the Philippines, but La Solidaridad a paper 
published by Filipinos in Barcelona (Ables 2003; Coronel 2001).  Upon American 
acquisition of the Philippines from the Spanish, a war ensued between the Philippines and 
the United States (U.S).   When peace came to the archipelago, American entrepenuers 
quickly established an English language press, which eventually outnumbered the 
Spanish language press (Ables 2003: 22). These papers introduced the U.S.-style of the 
commercial press as well as bringing modern printing technology (Coronel 2001: 113).  
Upon the onset of World War II, Japanese occupiers reconditioned radio sets in the 
Philippines to prevent receiving broadcasts from the U.S. (Ables 2003: 27); in addition to 
closing down all newspapers, only allowing one publication to run under close scrutiny 
(ibid.).  However, there was a thriving guerilla press distributing material secretly 
throughout the islands (Coronel 2001: 114).  During Martial Law under Marcos, congress 
was abolished, and Marcos became the sole legislator in issuing decrees, proclamations 
and executive orders (Ables 2003: 32). Opposition media was systematically censored. 
All publications, as well as radio and television broadcasts were closed until given a 
permit to operate (ibid.: 33). During this time, the press secretary and secretary of 
national defense were instructed to take over communications media, only allowing for 
government media and those run by cronies to operate (ibid.: 5).  Other than institutional 
censorship, intimidation and violence was used against the press, with 25 journalists 
killed during Martial Law (Maslog 1988: 32 cited in Ables 2003: 5).  The Philippine 
press has developed under tumultuous conditions.  The over fall of the Marcos regime 
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through non-violent means, known as People Power I, became a turning a point for the 
Philippine press after years of prosecution under Martial law.  The Constitutional 
Commission of 1986 under the newly elected President Aquino reestablished the 
provisions of freedom of speech, expression and press under the Bill of Rights.  Today, 
those provisions remain in the revised 1987 Philippine Constitution. 
 
More recently, the Philippine press played a pivotal role in the impeachment trial 
for President Joseph Estrada and advent of People Power II.  Journalist and researchers 
painstakingly went through property and real estate entitlements and tax records to 
uncover the corruption and gambling scandal that led to the impeachment of President 
Estrada, and their exposé’s used as evidence in court (Møller & Jackson 2002.).  The 
event proved to be a challenge to media in that economic pressure became a means of 
coercion for the Estrada administration (Coronel 2001).  However, new media, in 
particular the use of text messaging in mobile phones played a pivotal role, in that “SMS 
was used to coordinate the protests, keep protesters abreast of events as they unfolded, 
and to mobilize citizens to march, bring food, and to keep vigil” (ibid.: 110).  The 
“lightning speed” to which SMS was able to connect individuals was unmatched by 
television and radio (ibid.).  In addition, during that period as close as to 200 anti-Estrada 
online groups and 100 e-mail groups were formed (ibid.) New media presents a new area 
of research and discourse for democratic movements in the Philippines that is yet to be 
fully explored.  It must be noted however, that this phenomenon occurred largely within 
the Metro Manila area.   
 
The Philippine press and media today is vibrant, and presents itself in various 
mediums of communication, in particular television, radio and print. According to 2008 
statistics by the Philippine National Telecommunications Commission, there are 297 
television stations and 1,042 radio stations (383 AM and 659 FM), spread out amongst 17 
regions and 81 provinces .  In terms of newspapers, there are currently 9 broadsheets and 
19 tabloids in Metro Manila, and in the provinces, a total of 552 newspapers  (N Espina 
2009, e-mail, 30 April).  All major papers maintain websites, Inquirer.net, GMA News.tv, 
PhilStar.com, ABS-CBN News.com and SunStar News Exchange, which are updated 
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regularly (ibid.). In addition there are also a number of independent news sites such as 
Bulatlat.com, MindaNews, Davao Today, Dateline Philippines, Northern Dispatch, which 
provide alternative news analysis (ibid.).  Of the three mediums, radio has the largest 
reach amongst the rural poor, with AM radio as the main platform for news and public 
affairs programming with FM largely operating as music programming within urban 
areas  (Rosales 2006: 149). In addition, AM has the highest radio frequency wave, 
therefore able to reach “even the remotest towns and barrios in the Philippines” (ibid.).  
In contrast is print media, which is more costly, and serves as an important medium for 
policy makers, researchers, people in business and the diplomatic community. It does not 
have the same reach in rural and provincial areas. With 40% of the population under the 
poverty line (ibid.), and living on less than $2 a day (M Mangahas 2009, Interview, 26 
February), Filipinos are limited in their economic possibilities as it relates to media 
consumption. 
 
4.2 Killed Journalists: Where, When and How 
Various press and media organizations have a different total “body count” of journalists 
killed.  This is due to the methodological approach and operationalization of certain 
concepts that organizations utilized.  For instance, NUJP takes a more liberal count of the 
deaths (N Espina 2009, Interview, 26 February), in which it automatically considers 
every death of a journalist as being work related until proven otherwise.  With that 
measure, NUJP has a list of 100 journalists killed since 1986 and 65 since 2001.  
However, CMFR has a different approach in that it only counts a journalist as being 
killed due to the nature of their job when it can be verified as being work related.   The 
organization documents the deaths with a more stringent methodological policy (CMFR 
2007).  ‘Journalists,’ for example, is operationalized as someone who is known in their 
community as a journalist (LV Teodoro 2009, Interview, 6 March).  Through CMFR’s 
approach, the official count is 78 since 1986 and 40 since 2001.8  However, though such 
approaches differ, what remains the same is that the number of those journalists killed is 
                                                 
8 During the writing of the thesis, a journalist was killed, and CMFR has confirmed the 
new number to be 78.  However, because the study is bounded from 2001-2008, this 
death is not considered and will therefore use the count until December 2008, which 
stands at 77. 
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high, and second an increase in the frequency of deaths is most apparent during the 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s tenure, which began in 2001.  For the reason that 
CMFR has a publicly released methodological approach, it is this body count that will be 
used through out the course of the thesis.  
 
When considering the number of deaths during different administrations, 50.6% 
of the deaths occurred during the Arroyo administration, 7.8% under Estrada, 14.3% 
under Ramos and 27.3% under Aquino (ibid.). A mean average of journalists killed per 
administration per year is broken down as the following: Aquino, 3.5; Ramos, 1.83; 
Estrada, 2; Arroyo, 4.5.9  In relation to the location of the occurrences, 
AdministrativeRegions 3 and 12 have claimed 10 journalists each since 1986, followed 
by Region 4a at 9 and Regions 9 and 11 at 8 each (ibid.).10 Under Arroyo, Regions 3, 4 
and 12 have the highest amount of journalists killed.  In terms of island grouping, 
Mindanao has the highest number of killed journalists at 34 (44%), followed by Luzon 30 
(43%) and the Visayas 10 (13%) (ibid.).  
 
In relation to the high penetration rate of radio is the disproportionately high 
numbers of radio journalists killed in the line of duty since 1986,11 of the 77 journalists 
killed, 35 were working for radio, constituting to 45.5% of the total deaths; followed by 
24 journalists working for print media, at 31.2% of the total (CMFR 2009: 98).  In 2008, 
5 of the 6 journalists killed worked as anchors or commentators for a local radio station 
(ibid.).  Radio journalists killed “used their radio shows to criticize the actions of alleged 
gambling bosses and drug lords, some of who are also powerful politicians or police 
                                                 
9 Calculation compiled by the researcher.  
10 Refer to regional map (Appendix III) 
11 “Journalists/media practitioners killed in the line of duty” and “Journalist/media 
practitioners killed because of their work” are operationalized as meaning the same thing 
under the CMFR database and methodology. Under this definition, a total of 77 
journalists have been killed since 1986. However, when including journalists killed 
outside the line of duty or killed because of non-work related incidences, the total number 
increases to 128, as of December 2008. This may also be considered in relation to deaths 
per administration. Under the Arroyo administration, 65 in total have been killed, 
however, when operationalized as being killed in the line of duty or due to the nature of 
their work, the number decreases to 40 (CMFR 2009). 
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authorities” (Rosales 2008: 148).  However, many of the journalists worked in more than 
one medium.  For instance, 13 journalists worked for both radio and print, 1 for both print 
and television, and 1 for both television and radio (ibid.).  
 
 An investigation of the personal profiles of journalists’ killed reveal several 
distinguishable patterns. One of which is that most occur in provincial areas, and the 
journalists were working for local media and not in metropolitan areas such as Manila 
and Cebu (Rosales, 2006: 154; M Mangahas 2009, Interview, 26 February; LV Teodoro 
2009, Interview, 6 March; N Espina 2009, Interview, 26 February; Conference on 
Impunity). None of the journalists killed between 2001-2007 worked as affiliates for 
national news organizations, which are based in the Metro Manila.  A majority of the 
print and broadcast journalists killed worked as freelance journalists (CMFR 2007:71).  
In terms of the manner in which jou\\rnalists died, almost all deaths since 2001 occur by 
firearm, of which 35.9% of the journalists were killed while on their way home from 
work (CMFR 2009: 97), and were killed regardless of the time of day, as many occurred 
in broad daylight in front of bystanders. This indicates that the movements of such 
journalists were under surveillance prior to their murders and that those who commit the 
crime therefore had no fear of punishment or reprisal that may come as a result. The 
deaths do not come as a surprise, as most receive threats prior to their assassination (N 
Espina 2009, Interview, 26 February). Most of the deaths were committed by masked 
men, and in a number of cases, journalists were ambushed by men on motorcycles (ibid.).  
This takes on a pattern reflected in the manner of which extra-judicial killings of political 
activists, judges and lawyers have also been documented (N Espina 2009, Interview, 26 
February; Melo Commission Report 2007; Philip Alston 2007).  
 
 All journalists killed were reporting on local issues affecting their provinces, and 
or towns.  They reported on corruption by local politicians and public officials, police 
abuse of power, military activities, illegal gambling activities, drugs abuse and drug 
syndicates, Abu Sayyaf and the Communist Party of the Philippines/National People’s 
Army (CPP/NPA).  Journalists, regularly covered more than one topic.  For instance, of 
the 33 journalists killed from February 2001- April 2007 (CMFR 2007: 75-78), 18 
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reported on local government corruption, and or by local politicians and or public 
officials; 6 reported on the proliferation of drugs and drug syndicates; 5 on police 
corruption and abuse of power; 3 reporting on the activities of the CPP/NPA, the military 
and illegal gambling syndicates.  In at least 9 of these cases, government personnel, 
including officials and personnel have been officially identified as prime suspects (ibid.: 
70).   
 
As a whole, the numbers and profile of journalists killed paint a picture in which 
killings occur in dispersed regions and provinces throughout the Philippine archipelago, 
and that the journalists are targeted due to the nature of their jobs as reporters of local 
anomalies, corruption, crime and official malfeasance.  Within the context of the 
Philippines, there are institutional influences that shape the occurrences of journalist 
killings.  
 
5. THE PHILIPPINES AS A WEAK STATE 
“A democracy doesn’t kill its messengers.” –Nonoy Espina 
 
In this section, the postulation that the Philippines, as a weak state, presents three 
conditions that enable the deaths of journalists to occur and continue. These conditions 
are local/provincial politics in which patronage and personal interests reign; the state’s 
inability to monopolize the legitimate means of violence; and the culture of impunity that 
arises as part of the ineffectiveness of the judicial system.  
  
5.1 Philippine Politics: All Local 
Philippine politics during the post-dictatorship era has been described as a return to pre-
dictatorship “elite democracy” (Hawes 1987, Bello & Gershman 1990, Stauffer 1990, 
cited in Quimpo 2005: 229), and one that is reflective of a “cacique democracy” 
(Anderson 1988 cited in Quimpo 2005: 229)). More recent works have defined the post-
dictatorship politics as one that is of a “patrimonial oligarchic state” and a “clientelist 
electoral regime” in which “electorally competitive national regime which falls short of 
the minimum democratic threshold because of the persistence of local authoritarian 
enclaves” (Franco 2001: 71 cited in Quimpo 2005: 232).  Though each lends itself to its 
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own definition of the Philippine political system, all are descriptions that do not lend the 
Philippine state as a strong one; but rather one that is bureaucratically weak, and is 
plagued by a system in which personal interests override state interests power is vested 
within localities.  It is thus parochial, reactive and visionless (Sosmeña 1999 cited in Van 
de Loo 2004: 265).  In a rudimentary sense, such a political system in which authoritarian 
enclaves exists are reminiscent of “tribalism” and “warlordism” (M Mangahas 2009, 
Interview, 26 February; N Espina 2009, Interview, 26 February) in a democratic 
Philippines. 
 
 Taken such descriptions into consideration, Philippine politics today is the 
product of the advancement of the elite and political strong men in the pre-Marcos era.  
Dominant social forces in the post World War II era in the Philippines, such as family 
clans, settler leaders, and landed elites (Abinales & Amoroso 2005: 191) were met with 
the rise of a new elite-- “strong-men”. These men drew their strength from first, 
Commonwealth-era education initiated by the United States that pulled these men out of 
ranks of the lower-class; and second from coercive resources amassed when these men 
were engaged in guerilla warfare (ibid: 190). These men had no prewar commitment to 
the national Philippine state, and were localist in orientation (ibid.).  Strong men and the 
existing dominant social forces created a new relationship with the executive and 
legislative branches, in which state implemented initiatives were “eviscerated” through 
corruption, infiltration and the creation of networks for enrichment (ibid.) “The more the 
executive tried to accomplish, the more deals were needed. The bigger the program, the 
more spoils to be distributed. The stricter the controls, the more opportunities for bribery” 
(ibid.).  Executive branch also became entrenched in these networks.  Within this context, 
Philippine politics, became opportunistic and a system in which personal interests 
became a source of motivation.  Central government in Manila became apprehensive in 
imposing control or “demanding professional, efficient and corruption-free governance” 
where local power-holders— elites, dominant social forces--- “controlled their resources 
with weapons, private armies, or could simply withhold votes or switch allegiance” 
(ibid.).  In this local context, provincial areas became “out of sight, out of mind” (N 
Espina 2009, Interview, 26 February).  
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In more contemporary times, this in reflected in the Philippine House of 
Representatives which is made up of politically based elite that lack national prominence.  
It is dominated by members of traditional clans, some of which have an absolute hold on 
their respective districts (Rogers 2005).  The manner in which officials are elected in 
office is reflective of the Philippine state’s inability of exerting control within its borders.  
Elections in provincial areas are held with many intervening forces, which are identified 
as vote buying, intimidation, guns, or fraud (Linantud 1998; M Mangahas 2009, 
Interview, 26 February), and has been given the moniker of “guns, goons and gold.”  The 
1984 elections proved to be the bloodiest, claiming approximately 2000 lives but since 
the departure of Marcos, election violence has decreased significantly, with pre-poll 
deaths numbering between 40-73 in the 1990’s, reverting back to election violence levels 
of the pre-dictatorship years (Linantud 1998).   Leading up to 1998, the military and 
church were essential in decreasing election violence through monitoring local polling 
centers (ibid.).  However, during the same time period, approximately 2000 former or 
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National 
Police were involved in organized crime, and the government counted 24,000 men in 562 
private armies (ibid.)  Though election violence has decreased numerically it still 
continuous.  This also raises a question of military legitimacy as a monitoring force 
during political elections; and that the existence of private armies and government 
acknowledgement of such forces indicates that there is a coercive force that exists outside 
the legal framework that works within communities, and that the central government is 
incapable or hindered in addressing the issue. 
 
Coercive forms of control over local populations in the Philippine context have 
been referred to as “bossism” (Sidel 1999 cited in Quimpo 2005) and “authoritarian 
clientelism,” (Franco 2001 cited in Quimpo 2005).  Such forms of control have 
“Persistently and systemically intruded upon elections and distorted economic relations 
and social relations” (Quimpo 2005: 231) and reflects a situation in which “imbalanced 
bargaining relations require the enduring political subordination of clients and are 
reinforced by the threat of coercion” (Quimpo 2005: 232).  This reflects a democracy that 
does not allow citizens to make a clear choice (M Mangahas 2009, Interview, 26 
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February); creating a limitation to the participatory capacity of a citizen to engage locally 
and by extension nationally.  A key political good that a state must provide its citizens is 
the ability to participate freely, openly and fully in politics and the political process 
(Rotberg 2003: 3).  Under a liberal democratic framework, the Philippine state is weak 
and unable to deliver this political good in provincial areas where political power is 
monopolized, and coercive force lies in parallel to the state apparatus.   
 
This condition can be viewed as a free of law environment as opposed to a rule of law 
environment that would be a precondition of state strength in the liberal democratic 
framework (Rakipi 2002: 4). In a society where the social control is in the possession of 
various local level social organizations or groups, the “rules of behavior have been 
dictated by critically claimed strongmen –landlords, caciques, bosses, money lenders and 
others” (Migdal 2001:92 cited in Van de Loo 2004: 262).  In this context, the allocation 
of political posts is nepotistic in practice and  “reflect the loyalty of particular groups and 
the threat of other groups” (Migdal 1998: 274 cited in Van de loo 2004: 264).   With a 
political system and bureaucracy influenced with this form of social relationship on the 
local level, the state is weakened. It is thus incapable of fully providing security and the 
delivery of public goods (Rakipi 2002).  The lack of meritocracy creates a situation in 
which politics is visionless and does not serve the interests of the public at large, but 
rather personal interest of those with access to power on the local level.  Nepotism and 
the lack of meritocracy in this system are reflective of political dealings that are 
reactionary.  
 
For politicians and many other people occupying various positions that may lend 
the attention of a public eye, reputation is the main personal capital (Thompson 2000 
cited in Waisbord 2002b: 439-440).  However it can quickly erode when a scandal is 
exposed (ibid.), such as in exposés, reports and stories implicating wrong doing or 
discussing local anomalies.  Threats and physical attacks provide the most immediate 
remedy in “quelling” a scandal that can ruin legitimacy.  This is reflected through the 
many journalists killed that were either critical of and or reporting on local anomalies 
from political corruption and crime, with several local politicians and public officials as 
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suspected masterminds of some murders.  As indicated by the different localities of the 
killings, journalists are not killed systematically by the same people or groups.  They are 
committed as a part of a private agenda, and reflect an outgrowth of personalized politics.  
The killings can be seen as an attempt to prevent information to reach a public through 
targeting individuals.  In contrast, during the Marcos era, killings of journalists were 
based on an ideology and organized by the center of the government (M Mangahas 2009, 
Interview, 26 February), and thus targeted those critical of the regime.  There existed a 
“logical connection to who was in charge, who did what where you would go” (ibid.)  
The deaths of journalists during the democratic period, and the increase in occurrences 
during the Arroyo administration, reflect an access to violent means geographically in 
rural areas and provincial areas that is not controlled by the central government.  
 
5.2 Challenging the Legitimate Monopoly of Violence 
According to Max Weber (1978), the monopoly of the legitimate means of violence or 
force is necessary for modern states to ensure the rule of law. This problem with 
monopolization of violent means has been called the “crisis of the state” (Nagengast 
1994; Waisbord 2002). The Philippine state has struggled for decades with armed 
insurgencies, and its problem with terrorism has been noted as being “unrivalled by any 
other Southeast Asian nation” (Brown and Wilson 2007).  The military wing of the 
Maoist-Leninist organization the Communist People’s Party (CPP), the New People’s 
Army (NPA), and splinter groups of Muslim separatist groups, the MILF and Abu 
Sayyaf12 have continued to challenge the Philippine state.   
 
 For almost 40 years, the CPP-NPA-NDF13 and the Philippine government have 
been in a repetitive cycle of armed conflict and negotiations. At its peak, membership of 
NPA guerillas in 1987 was 25,000, going down to 6,000 in 1994 (Abinales and Amaroso 
                                                 
12 The Abu Sayyaf has largely resorted in banditry, more specifically, they are 
notoriously known for the kidnapping of foreign nationals and demanding ransom. It is 
largely viewed by experts in the Southeast Asian region as a criminal organization 
(Brown and Wilson  2007 referencing Wilson 2005)  
13 The NDF, acronym for the National Democratic Front is the negotiating legal body of 
the CPP. Today, it consists of an amalgamation of various left-leaning groups and 
organizations. 
  31 
2005: 266).  Today, there are approximately 10,000 fighters (Brown and Wilson, 2007). 
The “protracted people’s war” (Quimpo 2006:36) that the CPP-NPA have been tactically 
using has been decentralized (Abinales & Amoroso 1005: 15), and are largely occurring 
as skirmishes and battles in provincial parts of the Philippines between guerillas and the 
AFP.  The NPA garners little support from cities and metropolitan areas, but are popular 
amongst the disaffected population in the countryside, where rural poverty is a daily 
reality (ibid.:267; Brown & Wilson 2007). In 1998, the NDF forged negotiations around a 
“Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law” (Quimpo 2006: 35). However, the government in 2000 declared an 
“all out war” with the CPP-NPA-NDF, and in 2001, the CPP-NPA-NDF’s diplomatic 
manouevering was greatly hampered when the United States and the European Union 
(EU) put the organization on a terror list (ibid.: 34). With a government that is generally 
perceived as being elitist, the CPP-NPA-NDF will continue to gain adherents as long as 
disaffection and socio-economic issues in provincial areas are not addressed.  
 
Islamic militancy and separatism in the Southern Philippines has been a political 
and military challenge to the state, developing after hundreds of years of marginalization.  
For the past 40 years, the armed conflict in Mindanao has approximately killed 120,000 
people and displaced some two million civilians (Relief Web 2008).  It is estimated that 
the MILF has between 12,000-15,000 combatants (Abuza 2003: 90).  The involvement of 
Al Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah in the Philippines has been documented in detail (ibid.; 
Brown and Wilson 2007), and has resulted in the Philippines being part of the “second 
wave” of the war on terror (Brown & Wilson 2007).  This has led to an increase in U.S. 
involvement in Philippine military affairs through joint exercises and contributions to the 
Philippine military’s modernization program.  However, though such connections with 
international terrorist organizations exists, the concerns of groups such as the MILF are 
largely local in nature and context specific in the Philippines, and are directed towards 
autonomy and land acquisition in Mindanao (ibid.) The Muslim community represents 
the most impoverished community in the state, as well as having the lowest literacy rates.  
They have “legitimate grievances” (ibid.) lending to the government’s attempts to 
politically engage with the group. These grievances are rooted in historical claims of a 
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separate Muslim identity and nationalism, that of Bangsamoro.14  However, the MILF 
also work within the political system by influencing local politics in the Sulu Archipelago 
(Abuza 2003: 47).  In 2001, the Arroyo administration initiated a unilateral approach 
which led to the signing of the Tripoli ceasefire agreement (ibid.: 46).  However, large 
scale fighting broke out in 2008 between government forces and MILF when the 
Philippine Supreme Court deemed that the process in of government secession of land to 
an autonomous region was deemed as unconstitutional.15 The fighting led to a 
humanitarian crisis in which 300,000 people were internally displaced (UNHCR 2008). 
Similar to the communist insurgency, the Islamic insurgencies come out of political and 
socio-economic disparities amongst those populations marginalized, largely coming from 
provincial areas.  
 
Both forms of armed insurgency challenge the nature of the Philippine state both 
ideologically and through violent means.  They contribute to the general level of 
insecurity within the Philippines, which affect the structural political conditions of the 
state.  More specifically, they represent “violence from below”—popular insurrections 
and armed struggle (Sosa Elizaga 1995, Wickham-Crowley 1995, cited in Waisbord 
2002).  However, other than the difficulty in monopolizing the means of violence on 
these fronts, the legitimate monopolization of violence is further hampered by the 
corruption and the “skills” that numerous of members of the AFP and the PNP have 
offered privately, in organized crime16 or as hitmen for private armies. In addition, is the 
implication of the Philippine military’s involvement in the large spate of extra-judicial 
killings that have risen dramatically since 2001 and the advent of “death squads” in the 
Davao region of the Philippines (Alston 2007) which has garnered much international 
attention.  
 
                                                 
14 Which is separate from the Filipino identity, which is deemed as largely Hispanic and 
Christian as a result of Spanish colonization. 
15 Unconstitutionality was deemed on the grounds that Christian communities were not 
consulted over which land was to be incorporated to the autonomous region.  
16 Previously noted in Philippine Politics: All Local 
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John Keane (1996 cited in Waisbord 2002a) describes the concept of “uncivil 
war” as one of two situations that is reflected in the crisis of the state.  “Uncivil war” 
refers to localized, scattered violence that lacks the logic of conventional civil war.  
Waisbord asserts that under this definition, attacks against journalists should be 
considered as “uncivil war” as the dispersal and the difficulty of singling definitive 
official responsibility attest to the privatization/autonomization of violence—existence of 
hitmen and death squads for the service of powerful “bosses” and druglords (ibid.).  In 
the case of the Philippines, this condition of uncivil wars is further exacerbated by 
popular uprisings. The scattered occurrences and lack of logical connection to the deaths 
of journalists are also reflected in the suspects which include local mayors, governors, the 
NPA, police officers, drug cartels, illegal gambling groups and government agency 
officials.  These actors are the subjects of the dead journalists reportage. Journalists killed 
were not killed during crossfire, or while covering armed fighting with insurgent groups 
in the Philippines.  This differs from studies worldwide on killings of journalists where 
general warfare is to blame for the deaths.   The violence that lead to the killings of 
journalists can therefore be viewed as being part and parcel of the general situation of 
violence that the state is unable to successfully mitigate; most especially in provincial 
areas.  The killings of journalists, or anti-press violence as a whole, is a “product of 
structural political conditions responsible for a generalized situation of violence” 
(Waisbord 2002a: 100).  Taken into consideration, the Philippine state is unable to 
deliver the political good of human security, which is a state’s prime function, and is thus 
indicative of its condition as either a weak or strong state (Rotberg 2003: 3).   
 
5.3 A Weak Judicial System and Impunity 
The Oxford English Language Dictionary defines impunity as “freedom from punishment 
or injury” (1995: 598).  A more juridical definition of impunity goes even further, 
defining it as “exemption from accountability, penalty, punishment or legal sanction for 
perpetrators of illegal acts” (Afflito 2000; McSherry and Molina 1992 cited in Opotow 
2001:149).  Impunity is a problem that rises from a weak judicial system (LV Teodoro 
2009, Interview, 6 March; CPJ’s 2009 Global Impunity Index in Manila; Opotow 2001). 
This assertion has been reaffirmed by interdisciplinary literature on transitional literature 
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that posit that impunity is an injustice and undermines the rule of law (Ensalaco 2005), In 
2008, the Philippine press held the Manila Conference on Impunity and Press Freedom,17 
in an attempt to address the barriers in the judicial system that prevent proper action 
which identified censorship by killing as a threat to freedom of expression (CMFR 2008). 
 
The judicial review system in the Philippines is based on the U.S. system18, with 
civil code based on Spanish law (R Azcuna 2009, Interview, 5 March).   In the 1987 
Constitution judicial power is vested in the Supreme court as well as a network of 
Regional Trial Courts, (RTC) Municipal Courts (MC) and Sharia Courts19 (Franco 2007: 
1860) In addition is the Barangay Justice System (BJS), a non-state system for dispute 
processing most prevalent in rural and provincial areas (ibid.: 1859). A study conducted 
by Franco and the Transnational Institute (2008)20, investigates the attempt at judicial law 
reform in stratified societies, focusing on the rural poor in the Philippine countryside.  
According to the research and findings the Philippine judicial field is fragmented with 
“state law agents and instruments dispersed across administrative and (quasi) judicial 
subarenas” (ibid.: 1863), which is reflected in the formal administrative courts, Sharia 
Courts and BJS.  This runs in parallel to a “patrimonial field” that operates through (a) 
landed elites, their overseers and private armies; (b) “captive” local public authorities 
such as municipal/village officials, public attorneys, police and judges that reinforce 
landlord or elite control (ibid.).  A patronage network is a hindrance to rural access to the 
judicial system. Essentially, private authority overrides public authority that is supposed 
to be legally protected.  In addition poor litigants are pressured by various government 
officials and community actors to avoid courtroom litigation and resolve conflicts in non-
state systems such as the BJS; and in combination with the cost of time and legal work 
through state mechanisms, many turn to the BJS (ibid.).  However, elites rarely engage 
with people or groups at the Bargangay or village level (ibid.; 1864).  This form of 
                                                 
17 A conference different from the CPJ Impunity Index.  The Conference speakers largely 
included those from Spain and Latin America; the latter in particular, has been under 
going successful judicial reform projects and has made very clear examples at attempts at 
combating impunity (Conference; Interview, Azcuna). 
18 The Philippine 1987 Constitution is based on the U.S. constitution 
19 Only in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
20 Based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
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judicial interaction, according to the research, is especially true to “remote interiors 
‘invisible’ to national governments, urban-based media or public watchdog groups” 
(ibid.).  Law reform does not take into full account the local socio-political conditions 
that impede equal access to the judicial system.  However, the research does show there 
are ways for rural people seeking judicial recourse to overcome such obstacles, through 
an alternative “rights-advocacy network” to serve as a support structure and an effective 
form of political-legal mobilization (ibid.: 1869). 
 
 Cases dealing with the murders of journalists in the Philippines are reflective of 
the difficulty faced with going through the judicial process, especially as it affects 
provincial areas the most.  All convictions are of the trigger-men, not the masterminds.  
However, one case that has the possibility of setting precedence is that of Marlene Garcia 
Esperat, a journalist from Sultan Kudarat, married with three children.  Some years 
before, her husband, also a journalist was killed.  Esperat was dubbed the “Erin 
Brokavich” of the Philippines, working as a columnist for the Midland Review, and as a 
block-time radio broadcaster (CPJ’s 2009 Global Impunity Index in Manila ).  Esperat 
was shot dead in her home on March 24 2005, the eve of Easter, in front of her children.  
She was under the Witness Protection Program (WPP), and had just sent her security 
guards home the day that she was shot (ibid.). Prior to her work as a journalist, Esperat, 
worked as a trained chemist and after as a resident ombudsman for the Mindanao 
Department of Agriculture, during which she became aware of anomalies in funding. She 
became a whistleblower, documenting in detail cases of official corruption and misuse of 
funding, but also taking upon herself to file formal complaints in court (ibid.).  Esperat’s 
case has the opportunity to set precedence, as it is the only case in which the named 
masterminds will be put into trial, with conviction possible as evidence, as far as 
masterminds are concerned, are in place (N. Santos 2009, Interview, 23 March). Osmeña 
Montañer and Estrella Sabay, are the named masterminds, officials from the Mindanao 
Department of Agriculture.  They were named by a former employer of Sabay, who 
admitted to coordinating the murder.  His testimony led to the first conviction of the 
trigger-men.  Recently, the accused have filed a second Motion of Reconsideration, 
which will delay the arrest warrant and the arraignment process. From the beginning 
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jurisdiction for the masterminds was a very difficult, in that the case was initially 
dismissed in 2005 by Tacurong City Regional Trial Court.21 When the case was relocated 
to a more neutral trial court in Cebu, the judge cited lack of jurisdiction in the case, and 
was set back to Tacurong City.  In an attempt to mitigate possible local political 
influences in the regional trial courts, the Esperat legal team, with the help of the Task 
Force 21122 is working to have the venue of the trial changed to Makati City, in Metro 
Manila (N. Santos 2009, Presentation 23 March). The need to prosecute, not just the 
hitmen, but the masterminds, is an imperative in fighting impunity and strengthening the 
judicial system. 
 
Most of the cases in the Philippines do not have the same national attention, or 
opportunities to get their case heard, visible in the fact that only 2 cases have gone to 
court with convictions since 2001 and since 1986, only 5 cases have had convictions of 
the triggermen (Pavia 2009, Presentation 23 March).  Esperat’s case is the only one in 
which masterminds will be tried. In the Philippines prosecution relies heavily on 
witnesses, as the basis of most convictions relies on their testimony; thus making the role 
of the WPP extremely valuable (LV Teodoro 2009, Interview, 6 March).  In the 
Philippines, the number of cases has mounted over the years and logistical support for 
prosecuting criminal cases, particularly in rural areas has declined. The Philippine 
Witness Protection Program (WPP) is extremely weak, under funded and witnesses are 
not relocated (ibid.), leaving witnesses in local conditions where they may face external 
pressures and threats.  By the end of 2007, approximately 2400 people were relying on 
the services of the WPP, 90% of who are from the poorer sectors of society (Manila 
Conference on Impunity 2008).  The Special Rapportuer of the U.N. described that the 
“WPP is impressive---on paper.  In practice, however, it is deeply flawed and would 
seem only to be truly effective in a very limited number of cases. The result /…/ is that 8 
out of 10 strong cases, or 80% fail to move from the initial investigation to the actual 
prosecution stage” (Alston 2007 cited in CMFR 2007: 28).  
                                                 
21 The court of jurisdiction for the murder. 
22 Government Task Force in prosecuting extra-judicial killings of activists and media 
members under the Department of Justice.  
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  The Supreme Court has made some very clear attempts to address the issue of 
impunity and media killings.  In particular is the implementation of the Writ of Amparo23 
as a rule making body that took into effect on October 24, 2007 (Supreme Court 
Document 2007).  The Writ of Amparo was created to cope with the general rise of 
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, as the nation did not have the proper legal 
mechanism to deal with the situation (R Azcuna 2009, Interview, 5 March).  The Writ of 
Amparo originated from the Mexican legal system as the “recurso de amparo” 
(Sarmiento 2008: 4), which affected Latin America immensely, and it can now be found 
in many constitutions in Latin America, such as Argentina (Sarmiento 2008: 4, 8). The 
Writ provides certain protection and inspection orders. In the Philippines, it is a human 
rights protector and a justice tool in that (1) the petition for a writ is a remedy available to 
anyone where life, liberty and security is threatened or violated; (2) the writ covers 
government officials and private individuals/entities; (3) petition may be filed by by 
aggrieved party as well as by a “concerned citizen, organization, association or institution 
if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party;” 
(4) “the petitioner is exempted from the payment of the docket fee and other fees when 
filing the petition” (ibid.).  The significance of such provision for poor provincial 
Filipinos are immense; most visible in the second, third and fourth aspect of the Writ as a 
justice tool. The second, in covering government officials and private individuals/entities 
establishes that no one should be exempt from the law, and that everyone should have the 
equal opportunity to seek judicial recourse. The third is a recognition of the roles of 
various media and civil society organizations, such as FFFJ and NUJP in aiding the 
families of journalists through the bureaucratic measures that can become emotionally 
overwhelming for those families and individuals affected or threatened by/with death. 
This affirms the role of such organizations as providing an alternative support system for 
petitioners of the Writ.  While the fourth, exemption of fees by the petitioner, 
                                                 
23 Supreme Court Chief Justice Puno sponsored the National Consultative Summit on 
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances, on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit 
was attended by justices, activists, police officials, military leaders and politicians. The  
first proposal introduced in the Summit’s summary of recommendations was the 
operationalization of the Writ of Amparo in the Philippines (Sarmiento 2008: 3). 
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acknowledges the fact that provincial people are often the victims that need to seek 
recourse, but do not have the financial means to do so.  However, the application and 
coverage of the writ is still through RTCs (SC Document 2007:4), which once again puts 
into question how local influences and inequalities come into play.   
 
The general idea of the Writ of Amparo and the judicial reform process as a 
whole could be viewed within the context of the Philippine’s attempt to enforce 
constitutional rights of International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 
1966, a covenant based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ibid.) of which 
the Philippines is a signatory. Thus Amparo is reflective of international compliance, as 
articles of the 2 and 3 of the ICCPR mandate for an effective remedy (ibid). In addition is 
the UNESCO, 1997: Resolution no. 29, “Condemnation of Violence Against Journalists” 
which is parcel to the ICCPR and the UNDHR (De Jesus & Teodoro 2008: 28).  The Writ 
of Amparo is the Supreme Court’s way of saying no to killings and disappearances that 
“corrodes the rule of law in the Philippines,” and yes to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. (Sarmiento 2008: 19).  The Writ of Amparo is a hopeful progress in 
institutionalizing justice sector reform and the fight against impunity in the Philippines, 
which in the end will greatly contribute to a stronger, more stable state. Whether or not 
significant progress has been made since the Writ was put into place, it is “too early to 
tell” (R Azcuna 2009 Interview, 5 March).  The Writ has only been in place for 
approximately one and a half years, and its benefits as a rule making remedy are yet to be 
seen, much less measurable.  Because the remedy is new, there are challenges that the 
Philippine legal system faces with the implementation of the Writ and addressing the rise 
of media killings in general. One of which is the need to familiarize judges with the new 
remedy (ibid.). The Philippine Judicial Academy24 is currently engaged in lectures and 
trainings addressed mainly to judges to inform them about the new remedy and how it 
may be applied.  However, for judicial reforms and the Writ to be effective, other law 
enforcement agencies, such as the police must be part of the reform process and educated 
                                                 
24 Educational Arm of the Supreme Court 
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in the new writ.  In addition, it would have to actively consider and address how a 
historically entrenched system of patronage, clientelism and corruption can be 
transformed by reform.  
 
Susan Opotow (2001) describes how in a culture of impunity, direct and structural 
violence are indistinguishable (152).  Referencing Johann Galtung’s definition (1969), 
she explains that direct violence is “immediate, concrete, visible and committed by and 
upon particular people” (ibid.: 151); and  structural violence “is gradual, imperceptible, 
and diffused in society…including whose voice is systematically heard or ignored, and 
who gets particular resources and who goes without them” (ibid.).  In relation to the 
killings of Filipino journalists, this manifests itself in several ways.  First, is that the 
killings are a form of direct violence intended to harm a particular individual on the local 
level and a group of people, that being journalists.  Second, the existing socio-political 
system of patronage and clientelism, is reflective of structural violence as certain 
individuals are given privilege over others, influencing local judicial processes, which are 
slow and often inaccessible to many people, making recourse for the killings of 
journalists difficult. As a whole, this is informed by the Philippines as a weak state.  
 
 
6. THE PHILIPPINE PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
“The sad thing is, if you look at it, press freedom doesn’t even belong to the press. Its not 
the freedom of the to do what it wants, its just a logical extension of the people’s right to 
know.”  Nonoy Espina 
 
 
6.1  The Public Sphere and Freedom of the Press 
A more contemporary conception of a “pluralistic public sphere” (Berger 2002: 22) or 
many public spheres, is more applicable to the discussion on the Philippines.  Instead of 
focusing on the public sphere in Metro Manila, the study focuses on the provincial 
population as constituting a public sphere, as it also represents citizenry within a nation 
using the media or the press as a means for getting information.  In addition, “the public 
sphere notion interpellates people as equals sharing a common right” (ibid.: 34).  
Habermas asserts that in contemporary times, newspapers, radio, television and 
magazines are the media of the public sphere, and many scholars today still regard the 
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media as the main institution of the public sphere (ibid.: 32). Thus, the guarantee of 
freedom of the press is an imperative, and this is espoused in the Philippine Constitution.    
 
The 1987 Constitution under Article III, BILL OF RIGHTS, under Sections 4 and 
7, explicitly confer upon the freedom of the press (Maslog 1992: 342).  These sections 
state:  
“Sec. 4.  No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the 
press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for 
redress of grievances. 
 
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be 
recognized“ (ibid.). 
 
The role of a free press is that it must be able to keep a citizenry informed, acting as a  
“Fourth Estate” through which it reports abuses of power and the misconduct of officials, 
and provides a forum for a discussion of diverse opinions and ideas (Stone 1987; Jeffrey 
1986; Graber 1986).  
 
This is a guarantee that goes to the very core of a self-governing society (Stone 
1987: 11).  A direct implication of the killings of journalists is that it immediately 
threatens and limits the diversity of the press in provincial areas.  When a public voice 
reporting on corruption, crime and official malfeasance is silenced, information that is a 
matter of public concern is denied or prevented from reaching the public.  In addition, 
there is an apparent “demonstration effect of the killings,” in provincial areas, in which 
journalists where a killing has occurred are more cautious (LV Teodoro 2009, Interview, 
6 March).  Being cautious out of fear reflects a conscious attempt to avoid possible 
conflict or incur attention that could lead to a possible attack.  This is self-censorship, 
which itself limits the diversity of information available. “When the rule of law is 
precarious and media personnel feel unprotected against arbitrary violence, that fear and 
sense of insecurity may lead to self-censorship” (Chalaby 2000: 22). And certainly, with 
a weak state that is unable to ensure human security, and legal process by judicial means 
is slow, a logical precautionary action that a journalists will take is to limit the issues and 
scope of their reporting. As Kulachada Chaipipat of SEAPA indicated, when self-
censorship occurs, the media denies themselves freedom (2009, Interview 23 March).   
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The Philippine provincial press is unable to fulfill its key functions in holding 
criminals, institutions and politicians accountable and providing a forum for the 
discussion of a diverse opinions and ideas necessary to keep its citizenry informed.  The 
deaths of journalists can be viewed as being two fold: their killings are a violation of an 
individuals right to life, however as journalists, their deaths reflect a “social dimension” 
(LV Teodoro 2009, Interview, 6 March), as the provincial public sphere is limited from 
accessing information that is of concern to their immediate environment.  This social 
dimension is important, in that the denial of information inherently exempts a specific 
public sphere from participating in the deliberative processes of a democracy.  
Information provided by journalists is a necessity in the creation of public opinion, which 
in turn exerts political influence that is intended to effect change upon the given social 
environment and the direction of the state.  The provincial public sphere is prevented 
from effectively participating in the democratic processes of the state. Though freedom of 
the press is a constitutional guarantee, local conditions render the guarantee section 7 of 
Article III a challenge for the common right of the provincial public sphere.   
 
6.2 Mitigating the Effects  
There are steps being made to mitigate the adverse effects of journalist killings through 
the work of various press media and journalist organizations based in Metro Manila.  
These organizations gather financial, educational and voluntary resources that are 
available in the NRC that are extended to provincial areas where these resources are 
lacking.  As a whole, these efforts can be viewed as an active attempt at ensuring the 
diversity of the press, and by extension, the access to information of the provincial public 
sphere.  This is most evident in (a) the formation of the Freedom Fund for Filipino 
Journalists (FFJ); (b) safety training for journalists by the NUJP; (c) role of international 
human rights and media organizations. 
 
The FFJ was created in 2003 by CMFR, PCIJ, the Philippine Press Institute (PPI), 
US based newspaper Philippine News, and the Kapisanan ng Mga Broadkaster Pilipino 
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(KPB)25 as a result of the growing number of journalist killed since 1986 (CMR 2007: 
11). FFJ takes into consideration aspects of the deaths that are often overlooked, most 
significant of which is legal and financial assistance for the survivors of the killed 
journalists (LV Teodoro 2009, Interview, 6 March; CMFR 2007: 12).  This is significant, 
in that many victims’ families often loose a significant portion of their household income.  
The organization also takes care of psychiatric treatment of family members and deals 
with personal problems relating to the families of those individuals in the WPP (LV 
Teodoro 2009, Interview, 6 March).   
 
FFJ is partly funded by the Philippine government and by private donors (LV 
Teodoro 2009, Interview, 6 March) such as the Rory Pect Trust26 , which offers 
scholarships to the children of killed journalists, as well as financial grants to the families 
of freelance journalist killed while on assignment (CMFR 2007: 12).  In addition FFJ has 
coordinated the creation of “Rapid Response Teams” (Pavia 2009, Presentation, CPJ’s  
Global Impunity Index in Manila, 23 March) in the case that a killing is reported.  These 
teams are connected to a network of local groups that can coordinate in providing 
financial support, and if possible sending a media representative to the site of the killing 
to monitor police assessment and investigations for any anomalies (ibid.).  Though such 
teams are yet to be found in every corner of the Philippines, their creation is reflected in 
the “watchdog” role of the press in that it keeps a critical eye in institutional function.  
The legal and financial assistance help provide aid and resources to provincial families 
who otherwise may have difficulty accessing the judicial system and going through the 
litigation process.   
 
NUJP created a workshop focusing on the safety training of journalists, based on 
risks that journalists in the Philippines face.  According to Rowena Paraan, Executive 
Coordinator of the Media Safety Office, the workshop module is divided into three parts 
(2009, Interview, 23 March).27 First part of the training involves a discussion the 
                                                 
25 English translation: Association of Broadcasters of the Philippines. 
26 London based. 
27 In collaboration with the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) 
  43 
relationship between ethics and safety, as it relates to the Philippine media and 
government policies that affect press freedom (ibid.).  The second part is medical training 
in emergency situations, such as how to treat a colleague that is shot or treat a broken arm 
until proper medical service is available (ibid.). Third part of the workshop session 
teaches journalists how to deal with hostile situations such as abductions, surveillance, 
covering crowds and military checkpoints.  In addition NUJP has actively encouraged 
journalists to report “any threat that you see, have it documented, have it reported, make a 
fuss out of it. A lot of these killings were preceded by threats” (N Espina 2009, Interview, 
26 February).  A positive development in NUJP’s work is that more journalists are open 
about reporting threats and specifically identifying who is threatening them (ibid.). 
Though it is impossible to erase all danger, NUJP is hoping that training journalists 
would be able to minimize the danger, as they become more aware of their working 
environment, what their jobs entail, and coping with various situations of danger.   
 
However, there are also journalists that arm themselves as a means of protection. 
This is especially true in provincial areas where journalists have been killed and in the 
southern part of the Philippines where there is a “strong gun culture” (Paraan 2009, 
Interview, 23 March).  One media organization in the Philippines, ARMED advocates 
this approach.  However, NUJP documentation show that many journalists killed were 
actually armed at the time of their killings, and the organization stresses that arming does 
not stop the killers and neither does it solve the killings (ibid.; N Espina 2009, Interview, 
26 February).  Safety training is an alternative option to a violent means of protection.  
The training encourages journalists to report a threat and empowers them by providing 
them ways to control and manage their working environment to make it safer for 
themselves. This, in turn is an alternative to a more adversarial option of self-censorship 
out of fear, and providing a means in which press diversity can remain.   
 
Journalists and media organizations in the Philippines are not alone in their plight.  
Other international human rights and media organizations and are also working towards 
creating a healthier environment for the press.  The EU, Amnesty International and the 
UN have been particularly active in pressuring the Philippine government in taking action 
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towards addressing the general situation of human rights in the Philippines. The EU 
previously expressed concern over the general situation of political violence, media 
killings and human rights situation in the Philippines; and in response, President Arroyo 
met with members of the Council, assuring that steps towards addressing the killings via 
the creation of an independent commission had ensued (Office of the President 2006a). 
The Melo Commission is mandated to make a report to the President detailing policy 
recommendations and legislative proposals (Office of the President 2006b). The EU 
offered to extend training and financial aid, as well as forensic training to investigators 
and aid to purchase tools needed for investigations (International Herald Tribune 2006). 
Similarly, Arroyo met with members of Amnesty International, which released a 2006 
report on the human rights situation in the Philippines (Office of the President 2006c). 
During the meeting, the President outlined the goals of the Melo Commission.  As a 
response, Amnesty International provided the President Arroyo with policy suggestions 
that were reiterated in the Commission’s final report completed in January 2007.28 
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur Report written by Philip Alston brought attention 
to the human rights situation in the Philippines, and the need for the government to take 
action.  The UN report is of particular importance, in that the Philippines, is a nation that 
is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UNESCO, 1997: Resolution 
no. 29, “Condemnation of Violence Against Journalists.”  This signifies that the 
Philippine state has international obligations related to the protection of its citizens.  As a 
whole, these international elements, though relating to the general situation of the 
Philippines, are essential in highlighting the role of the state and government in ensuring 
the security of its population. 
 
International media groups, such as Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), International 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and CPJ have played an important role as an “external 
Fourth Estate” and working towards strengthening the domestic capacity of Philippine 
press and media organizations.  RSF releases annual report that detail the press situation 
                                                 
28 The Melo Commission report, focused primarily on extra-judicial political killings, 
with a small portion dedicated to the media killings.  Amongst its recommendations is the 
need for greater accountability within the Philippine Military (Melo Commission Report 
2007). 
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in nations around the world. The organization keeps a “close eye” on the Philippine 
situation, writing articles and publishing photos of journalists attacked or killed.  The IFJ 
in 2004 created a projects division, in which the organization has three main focus areas: 
safety, relations with government and the defense of professional rights (IFJ 2008).  
Under the projects division, IFJ was able to partner with NUJP in the creation of the 
Media Safety Office.  As part of the project, an emergency hotline was created, where 
journalists can call to report an incident of threat (ibid.)  In provincial areas this is 
important in that a Metro Manila organization is immediately alerted, and by extension an 
international media organization is also able to record and verify the incident.  CPJ’s 
Campaign Against Impunity, launched in 2007, has played an important role in 
establishing the relationship between press freedom and judicial systems worldwide.  
Elizabeth Withchel, CPJ coordinator of the Impunity Campaign, indicated that impunity 
as an issue is gaining ground in state diplomacy (2009, Interview 23 March).  An 
example is that senators in the US government interested in the situation of impunity in 
the Philippines have come forward asking for more information (ibid.).  As a whole, the 
international media organizations are able to provide external support to Filipino 
journalists to help strengthen their domestic capacity as well as bringing international 
attention to the attention of journalist killings.  
 
Journalists, media organizations and international organizations are working 
towards creating a safer working environment in the Philippines.  By doing so, they are 
taking an active role in ensuring that the provincial public sphere receives information 
that is their right as citizens.  In this respect, media organizations invoke a public service 
role, in that they are addressing the population not just as audience members that 
inactively receive information, but as citizens that constitute a nation.  This reflects an 
admonishment of an existing provincial sphere that is part of the deliberative process and 
should be actively included in the functions of democracy.  
 
7. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS 
“We gotta long, long way to go.” Nonoy Espina 
 
The study has three key findings:  
  46 
1. The killings of journalists are related to the socio-political conditions of the 
Philippines as a weak state; 
2. The immediate effects of their deaths are that the diversity of the press and the 
general public’s right to know and be informed about important affairs are 
threatened and limited.  
3. As a response to the situation, journalists and media organizations have taken 
concrete actions towards creating a safer working environment and mitigating the 
adverse effects of the killings. 
 
What can be derived from the study is that antipress violence and the killings of 
Filipino journalists must be considered within the three conditions that are reflective of 
the Philippines as a weak state, which are interrelated and cannot be separated from the 
other.  The killings of journalists reflect the state’s incapability to monopolize the 
legitimate means of violence and the lack of accountability of those responsible.  In the 
Philippines, we see this as occurring with the government’s inability to monopolize the 
legitimate means of violence through the existence of insurgencies and the participation 
of law enforcement and the military in extra-legal activities; and second the weakness of 
the judicial system that lends accountability and prosecution a challenge.  This problem 
plagues provincial areas the most.  These two conditions, in turn cannot be separated 
from coercive Philippine electoral politics.  The Philippines, as a weak state, make 
journalistic work an even greater imperative, as the general citizenry need information 
about their existing environment to make proper steps towards addressing and bettering 
the socio-political system.  When journalists are explicitly threatened and killed 
information intended for the provincial public sphere is prevented from dissemination, 
there is a direct attempt at maintaining the existing status quo.  This does not just apply to 
provincial areas where the killings occur, but also to the metropolitan public sphere, 
which is also adversely affected and deprived of information from the provinces. As a 
whole, the deaths of journalists in the Philippines challenge the notion of a “free press.“  
To what extent it is free is questionable, as freedom to report issues of public concern 
does not translate to freedom from murder or freedom from self-censorship out fear.  
 
 
The Philippine government has taken actions to addressing the issue. Task Force Usig 
under the PNP was specifically created in 2006 as a separate investigatory body to 
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address extra-judicial killings of political activists and media killings.  Currently, it is 
investigating 28 cases of media killings (Task Force Usig 2009).  In conjunction is the 
creation of this body is Task Force 211, under the Department of Justice, which works on 
prosecution.  In addition, President Arroyo is due to release 1.5 million pesos29 to FFJ in 
order to cover the costs of legal investigation, witness protection, research and forensic 
capability building (Task Force 211 2009). Together with the implementation of the Writ 
of Amparo, these measures allow for the killings of journalists to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis.  These measures are hopeful, in that they are a means of addressing the 
issue through government institutions.  However, these measure do little in addressing the 
fundamental problems at the root of the killings.  Systemic changes need to occur, in 
particular solving long running conflicts, improving transparency and accountability of 
political institutions and strengthening the various agencies of the legal system.  This 
presents a great challenge to the Philippines in its road towards becoming a consolidated 
democracy.  But one may ask the question of how can the Philippine situation improve if 
no fundamental systemic changes take place? 
 
International and civil organizations play a key role in this respect.  In regards to the 
killings of journalists, international groups are able to exert some state pressure and 
emphasize the need for state responsibility within its own borders.  On the other hand, 
civil society organizations in the Philippines are able to provide immediate support and 
resources to those in need; essentially fulfilling gaps where a weak state is inhibited or 
unable to act.  The existence of civil society organizations in the Philippines reflect that 
various elements within the nation are mobilizing different sectors of the population and 
taking active positions in the democratization of the nation.  The plurality of these civil 
society organizations gives voice and expression to issues that often do not garner the 
attention of the state.  In the face of a weak state, their impact and prospects for the better 
protection of journalists is immense.   
 
 Many other developing nations like the Philippines are working towards 
becoming consolidated democracy.  Though not all nations face a high number of killed 
                                                 
29 Approximately  $31,250 USD 
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journalists, there are other areas of discussion that are related to the press and new 
democracies that may be explored.  Several areas of further resesarch are: to what extent 
do the socio-political conditions of a nation affect the way the press is censored; in what 
ways can the state and press organizations collaborate in the process of democratization; 
what are the media and press needs of provincial areas as opposed to urban or 
metropolitan areas; and the prospects of new media as a democratic form of 
communication in stratified societies.  
  49 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Articles 
 
Alston, P 2007, ‘Report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitraty 
executions, Philip Alston, mission to Philippines’, Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, OHCHR.  
 
Amnesty International 2008, ‘Shattered peace: the human cost of conflict in Mindanao’, 
ReliefwWeb, viewed 15 March 2009, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-7KWJ6K?OpenDocument 
 
Anderson, B 1988, ‘Cacique democracy in the Philippines: origins and dreams’, New Left 
Review, vol. 169, pp. 3-31. 
 
Bello, W & Gershman, J 1990, ‘Democratization and stabilization in the Philippines’, Critical 
Sociology, vol. 17, Spring, pp. 35-56. 
 
Berger, G 2002, ‘Theorizing the media-democracy relationship in southern Africa’, Gazette: The 
International Journal for Communication Studies,  vol. 64, no. 1, pp 21-45.  
 
Bishop, R & Phillips, J 2006, ‘Violence’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, no. 2-3, pp. 377-
385.  
 
Bohara, AK, Mitchell, NJ, Nepal, M & Raheem, N 2008, ‘Human rights violations, corruption, 
and the policy of repression’, The Policy Studies Journal, vol. 36, no. 1. 
 
Bromley, M 2006, ‘Journalism and democracy: an evaluation of the political public sphere’, 
European Journal of Comunication, vol. 21, pp. 108-110. 
 
Chalaby, JK 2000, ‘New media, new freedoms, new threats’, Gazette: The International Journal 
for Communication Studies, vol. 62, no. 1, February, pp. 19-29. 
 
Chivers, CJ 2006, ‘Journalist critical of Chechen war is shot dead’, New York Times, 8 October, 
viewed 23 February 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/world/europe/08russia.html 
 
Clayman, SE 2004, ‘Arenas of interaction in the mediated public sphere’, Poetics, vol. 32, pp. 
29-49. 
 
Coronel, SS 2001, ‘The media, the market and democracy: the case of the Philippines’, The 
Public, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 109-126. 
 
Eide, M 2007, ‘Encircling the power of journalism’, Nordicom Review, Jubilee Issue 2007, pp. 
21-39. 
 
  50 
‘E.U. offers training, money, to help Phlippines stop killings of activists’, International Herald 
Tribune 2006, viewed 23 November 2008, www.iht.cm/bin/print.php?id=3707695 
 
Galtung, J 1969, ‘Violence, peace and peace research. Journal of Peace Research 3: 167-191. 
 
Graber, DA 1986, ‘Press freedom and the general welfare’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, 
no. 2, pp. 257-275.  
 
Habermas, J, Lennox, S & Lennox, F 1974, ‘The public sphere: an encyclopedia article (1964)’, 
New German Critique, no. 3, Autumn, pp. 49-55. 
 
Habermas, J 2006, ‘Political communication in media society: does democracy still enjoy an 
epistemic dimension? the impact of normative theory on empirical research’, 
Communication Theory, vol. 16, 411-426. 
 
Hallin, DC & Papathanassopoulos, S 2002, ‘Political clientelism and the media: southern Europe 
and Latin America in comparative perspective’, Media Culture & Society, vol. 24, pp. 
175-195. 
 
Huges, S 2007, ‘Explaining press performance in new democracies: the organizational 
imperative’, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, vol. 3, no. 1, July, p. 79-97.   
 
Integrated Regional Information Network 2008, ‘Women suffer most from the Mindanao 
conflict’, UNHCR Refworld, viewed 15 March 2009, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,PHL,4562d8cf2,4934ffc2c,0.html 
 
International Federation of Journalists 2008, IFJ Asia Pacific Projects, viewed 23 February 
2009, http://www.ifj.org/en/pages/ifj-global-projects 
 
Jeffrey, AJ 1986, ‘Free speech and press: an absolute right?’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 8, 
no. 2, May, pp. 197-226.  
 
Linantud, JL 1998, ‘Whither guns, goons, and gold? The declineof factional election violence in 
the Philippines’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 20, no. 3, December, pp. 298-318.   
  
Matloff, J 1995, ‘Shooting the messenger journalists brave danger in Africa’, Christina Science 
Monitor, viewed 18 April 2009, http://elin.lub.lu.se.ludwig.lub.lu.se/cgi-
bin/linker/ebeso_local? 
 
Møller, L & Jackson J 2002, ‘Journalistic legwork that tumbled a president: a case study and 
guide for investigative journalists’, World Bank Institute.  
 
Nagengast, C 1994, ‘Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology, vol. 23, pp. 109-136.  
 
  51 
Opotow, S 2001, ‘Reconciliation in times of impunity: challenges for social justice’, Social 
Justice Research, vol. 14, no. 2, June, pp. 149-169. 
 
Park, DJ 2002, ‘Media, democracy, and human rights in Argentina’, Journal of Communication 
Inquriy, vol. 26, no. 3, July, pp. 237-260. 
 
Parkinson, J 2006, ‘Notes and comments: rickety bridges: using the media in deliberative 
democracy’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 36, no.1, pp. 175-183. 
 
Perkins, M 2002,’Freedom(s) of the press in Latin America: reconciling sociental and individual 
rights in international law’, Gazette: The International Journal for Communication 
Studies, vol. 64, no. 1, February, pp. 5-19. 
 
Quimpo, NG 2005, ‘Oligarchic patrimonialism, bossism, electoral clientelism, and contested 
democracy in the Philippines’, Comparative Politics, vol. 37, no.2, January, pp. 229-250. 
 
Quimpo, NG 2006, ‘The use of human rights for the protraction of war’, Kasarinlan: Philippine 
Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 34-54.  
 
Rakipi, A 2002, ‘The weak states & the role of international institutions’, NATO Defense 
College, Rome, pp. 75-112. 
 
Rosales, RG 2006, ‘Shooting the messenger: why radio broadcasting is a deadly profession in 
the Philippines’, Journal of Radio Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, May, 146-155.  
 
Ricchiardi, S 1995, ‘Killing the messenger’, viewed 18 April 2009, http://www.ajr.org/article 
_printable.asp?id=1509  
 
Riddick, L, Thomson, G, Wilson, N & Purdie, G 2008, ‘Killing the canary: the international 
epidemiology of the homicide of media workers’, J Epidemiol Community Health, vol. 
62, January, pp. 682-688. 
 
Sosmeña, G 1999, ‘Concept of Bureaucratic Sedition’, NDCP occasional papers, Quezon City, 
http://apan-info.net/ndcp/occasional_papers/PDF/bursedition.pdf, pp. 31-43, viewed 23 
November 2008.  
 
Staufer, R 1990, ‘Philippine democracy: contradictions of third world redemocratization’, 
Kasarinlan, vol. 6, pp. 7-22. 
 
Stone, GR 1987, ‘The responsibility of a free press’, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, vol. 40, no. 5, February, pp. 6-22.  
 
Tey, TH 2008, ‘Confining the freedom of the press in Singapore: a “pragmatic” press for 
“nation-building”?’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 30, pp. 876-905. 
 
  52 
Tumber, H & Waisbord, SR 2004, ‘Introduction: political scandals and media across 
democracies, volume II’, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 47, no. 9, May, pp. 1147-
1152. 
 
Van de Loo, B 2004, ‘The failure of the Philippine presidential system’, Asia Europe Journal, 
vol 2., pp. 257-269. 
 
Waisbord, S 2000, ‘La politica del palo’, Hemisphere, March, pp. n.n.  
 
Waisbord, S 2002, ‘Antipress violence and the crisis of the state’, The Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 90-109. 
 
Waisbord, S 2007, ‘Democratic journalism and “statelessness”’, Political Communication, vol. 
24, no. 2, pp. 115-129.  
 
 
Books 
 
Abinales, PN & Amoroso, DJ 2005, State and society in the Philippines, Rowman  & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., USA.  
 
Ables, HA 2003, Mass communication and Philippine society, The University of the Philippines 
Press. 
 
Abuza, Z 2003, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.   
 
Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility 2007, Philippine press freedom report 2007, 
Manila.   
 
Chua, YT 2001, ‘The power of an informed citizenry’, in Coronel, SS (ed), The right to know: 
access to information in Southeast Asia, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 
pp. 121-151. 
 
Creswell, JW 2007, Qualitative inquiry & research design: choosing among five approaches, 2nd 
edn, Sage Publications Inc.  
 
Ensalaco, M 2005, ‘Pinochet: A Study in Impunity’, in Nagy-Zekmi, S & Levia, F (eds), 
Democracy I Chile: The Legacy of September 11, 1973, Sussex University Press, pp. n.n. 
 
Flor, AG 1994, ‘Development communication: a fifth theory of the press?’, in Maslog, CC, 
Communication values and society, 2nd edn, New Day Publishers, Philippines, pp. 45-75. 
 
Franco, J 2001, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines, New York, Routledge, p. 71. 
 
Hawes, G 1987, The Philippine state and the Marcos regime: the politics of export, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press. 
  53 
 
Hutchcroft, PD 1998, Booty capitalism: the politics of banking in the Philippines, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press.  
 
Keane, J 1991, The media and democracy. Cambridge, England: Polity Press 
 
Keane, J 1996, Reflections on violence. London: Verso 
 
Maslog, CC 1994, ‘Society and communication, communication and society’, in Maslog, CC,  
Communication Values and Society, 2nd edn, New Day Publishers, Philippines, pp. 17-44. 
 
Maslog, CC 1988, Philippine communication: an introduction. Quezon City: New Day 
Publishers, p. 32.  
 
Migdal, JS 1988, Strong societies and weak states, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
 
Migdal, JS 2001, State in society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
 
O’Neil, PH 1998, ‘Democratization and mass communication: what is the link?’, in O’Neil, PH 
(eds), Communicating democracy: the media and political transitions, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., pp. 1-39. 
 
Rotberg, RI 2003, ‘Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: causes and indicators’, in 
Rotberg, RI, State failure and state weakness in a time of terror, Brookings Institution 
Press, pp. 1-25.  
  
Sidel, JT 1999, Capital coercion, and crime: bossism in the Philippines, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press.  
 
Taback, N & Coupland, R 2006, ‘Security of journalist: making the case for modelling armed 
violience as a means to promote human security’, in Borrie, J & Randin, VM (eds), 
Thinking outside the box in multilateral disarmament and arms control negotiations, 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), pp. 191-205. 
 
Weber, M., 1978, Economy and society, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Conference Papers 
 
Becker LB, Vlad T & Nusser N 2004, ‘Media freedom: conceptualizing and operationalizing the 
outcome of media democratization’, Presented to the Political Communication Research 
Section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research, Porto 
Alegre, Brazil.  
 
McConnell PJ & Becker LB 2002, ‘The role of the media in democratization’, Paper presented 
to the Political Communication Section of the International Association for Media and 
Communication Research, Barcelona, Spain.  
  54 
 
Quintos de Jesus, M & Teodoro LV. (eds) 2008, ‘Impunity and press freedom’, The Manila 
conference on impunity and press freedom, Manila, Philippines.  
 
 
Government Sources 
 
Azcuna, AS n.d., Notes for a primer on amparo, Republic of the Philippines supreme court 
document, Manila.  
 
Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings 2006, Report, created under 
administrative order no 157, Manila. 
 
 
Office of the President 2006, Palace Issues Administrative Order on Media Killings, 23 August 
2006, viewed 17 November 2008, n.n. 
 
Office of the President 2006, European Commission gives PGMA a Tap on the Back, 13 
September 2006, viewed 23 November 2008, 
www.op.gov.ph/printerfriendly.asp?newsid=16114   
 
Office of the President 2006, PGMA Seeks Out Amnesty International, is Pleased with Results, 
15 September 2006, viewed 23. November 2008, 
www.op.gov.ph/printerfriendly.asp?newsid=16130 
 
Philippine Department of Justice, Task Force 211, viewed 15 March 2008, 
http://www.taskforce211.com.ph/index.html 
 
Philippine National Police, Task Force USIG, viewed 15 March 2009, 
http://pnp.gov.ph/about/content/offices/spl_units/tf_usigupdates/usig_jun08/aboutusig.ht
ml 
 
Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court 2007, The rule on the writ of amparo, A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC, Manila.  
 
 
Interviews 
 
Interview with R Azcuna, Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, 5 March 2009.  
 
Interview with K Chaipipat, Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 23 March 2009 
 
Interview with N Espina, Deputy Secretary-General, Union of Journalists, Philippines, 26 
February 2009. 
 
  55 
Interview with M Mangahas, Executive Director, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 
26 February 2009. 
 
Interview with R. Paraan, NUJP Executive Director of the Media Safety Office, 23 March 2009 
 
Interview with Atty. N. Santos, Legal Counsel to Esperat Family, 23 March 2009.  
 
Interview with Dr. LV Teodoro, Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Philippines, 6 
March 2009.  
 
 
 
  56 
 
APPENDIX I: Letter of Request to Justice Puno forwarded to Justice Azcuna 
 
February 18, 2009 
 
Dear Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, 
 
 
I am writing this letter to humbly request a formal interview with your Honor. 
My name is Elinor Boayes Lumbang, a graduate student from the Institute of East 
and Southeast Asian Studies at Lund University, in Sweden. I am currently conducting 
research here in the Philippines, focusing on violence against media personnel 
(specifically extrajudicial killings) within a human rights – social justice framework. This 
research is part of my university and department requirements in completing a thesis and 
obtaining a degree in Asian Studies.   
During the process of my research, your pioneering sponsorship of the National 
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances of which the 
recommendation for operationalizing the writ of amparo in the Philippines was first 
proposed came to my attention.  My research later led me to your work within the 
Supreme Court to establish both the writ of amparo and the writ of habeas data within the 
Philippine legal system. This of particular interest to my research, as one of the aspects 
that I aim to understand is how human rights is interpreted within the context of the 
Philippines.   
I believe, your Honor, that you would be able to impart a unique perspective as it 
relates to human rights in the Philippines, and that the knowledge that you have is 
something that I will never be able to obtain from scholarly articles.   
 Thank you so much for your time and patience. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Elinor Boayes Lumbang 
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APPENDIX II: PCIJ Blank Interview Protocol 
 
Interview Protocol                                                                                  February     2009 
 
Start time:  
 
Interviewee: Malou Mangahas, Executive Director, Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism 
 
Interviewer: Elinor Boayes Lumbang, Institute for East and Southeast Asian Studies, 
Lund University, Sweden 
 
End time: 
 
Purpose: to gain insight on the state of Philippine investigative journalism and working 
conditions of Filipino journalists. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How is Philippine investigative journalism—alive and thriving? A diagnosis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Is there a difference in journalistic practices in metropolitan areas and provincial 
areas? 
a. Does this difference affect the “quality” of work? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Do such differences have something to with why provincial journalists are 
targeted? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. What aspects of the Philippine political culture affect investigative journalism? 
a. The state as an actor? 
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5. Inturn, how does it affect the advent of extrajudicial killings of journalists? 
 
 
 
6. As a case of violence, do you think it is extraordinary in the context of the 
Philippines? 
a. Is this connected to the political system’s attempt at democratization? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Has journalism in the Philippines experiences any changes since 2001/start of the 
Arroyo administration? 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Has extrajudicial killings adversely hampered investigative journalism? 
 
 
 
 
 
9. What other forms of violence do Philippine journalists face? 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Does journalism in metropolitan area (Manila) enjoy a type of privilege and 
protection that journalists rural areas do not have? 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Are metropolitan journalists more inclined to be influenced by market and self-
censorship?  
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APPENDIX III: Regional Administrative Map 
(Source: http://philippines-archipelago.com.map.htm) 
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APPENDIX IV:  Map of the Philippines 
(Source: Western Washington University   
http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~fasawwu/resources/maps/philippines-full.htm) 
 
 
